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Special Issue Introduction 
The year 2021 marks a major milestone in the global geopolitical 
history – 30 years since the collapse of the USSR. Our Special Issue is a 
scholarly reflection on the evolving and evolved narratives and perceptions 
formed in the post-Soviet time and space. In our focus is one piece of the 
post-Soviet puzzle – five independent states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Ukraine and Russia that once built the ‘western flank’ of the USSR. The five 
countries have remarkably different paths following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Yet, we argue that the three Baltic states, Ukraine and 
to certain degree Russia share a common plank in their identity of post-
communist states, sometimes described as “liminal Europeanness” 
(Morozov 2011, Filippov, 2020). A “historical legacy of the Western 
European Enlightenment, which invented and juxtaposed Western (superior) 
and Eastern (inferior) Europe” (Matheson et al. 2021) has triggered a 
particular vision of this region in Europe of “ever becoming European” and 
being “betwixt and between” (Mälksoo 2009) East and West. These spatial 
identities, related to the visions of core and periphery, intersect with the 
temporal dimension. The 30-year time line is a critical historical period when 
slowly evolving perceptions, images and narratives start crystallising into 
modified and/or new mental schemas shared collectively. Moreover, there is 
a new generation born after the watershed event – a generation without direct 
historical experiences of the USSR and its shared legacy. This generation is 
already the backbone of the work force and voting cohorts in the respective 
countries. New identities emerge – identities without reference to the Soviet 
past.  
The 30-year historical period is characterised by an uneasy intersection 
between different generations. The “rosy past syndrome” – a phenomenon 
well-known in political psychology (see Duffy 2018 for review) – means that 
older generations tend to see the past better than it used to be. While 
cognitive details fade as time goes by, the emotive and normative image 
elements remain and may dominate. This Special Issue reflects on the three 
image elements – cognitive, emotive and normative (see also Boulding 1959; 
Hopmann 1996) – and uses these concepts to reflect on political 
communication flows shaped by narratives and perceptions communicated 
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by influential opinion-maker and multipliers, as well as shared by the 
members of the respective societies. Of special interest to us are young 
people in the post-Soviet societies and their political imaginaries of the 
world, region, their country and themselves.   
The temporal dimension is important not only for its longer historical 
span. This region has become a new ‘hotspot’ in the geopolitics of Europe in 
the most recent history of the continent. It features the ongoing Russia-
Ukraine conflict following Ukraine’s Euro-Maidan in 2013-2014, Ukraine’s 
strategic vision of its “European choice” and its direction to the Euro-
Atlantic integration sealed by the Ukrainian Constitution. The region is 
marked by growing security concerns among the three Baltic states that are 
currently members of the European Union (EU) and NATO, and ardent 
supporters of Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation. Russia’s ambitious and 
aggressive geopolitical stance in the region and in the world is perceived by 
these four states to be the main threat. Such perceptions are reinforced by the 
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine by Russia (the first landgrab in the post-
WWII Europe), the war by proxy in the east of Ukraine, and numerous 
incidents and provocations challenging the Baltic states and Ukraine (e.g. 
Russian cyberattacks against Estonia, the capture of Ukrainian navy ships in 
November 2018, or deployment of substantial number of Russian troops – 
85,000 to 110,000  soldiers (The Washington Post 2021) – and military drills 
near the border with Ukraine in May 2021). Challenging relations between 
the Baltic States and Ukraine on the one side and Russia on the other are 
unfolding against the background of an increasing instability in the post-
Soviet space. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the bloody 
suppression of domestic opposition in Belarus in 2021 demonstrate that the 
post-Soviet space remains volatile 30 years into independence. This period 
has also demonstrated that the current leadership of the largest and most 
powerful post-Soviet state, Russia, is very clear in its visions that the collapse 
of the Soviet empire “was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
century” (NBC 2005). According to President Putin, if he had a chance to 
alter modern Russian history, he would reverse the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Reuters 2018). Perhaps more concerning is the Russian leadership’s 
consistent anti-Ukrainian frame – from the 2008 statement by President Putin 
to President Bush that “Ukraine is not a country” (The Washington Post, 
2018) to his most recent statement that Ukraine is becoming “anti-Russia,” 
“requiring our special attention from a security point of view” (Reuters 
2021). The Baltic states remain highly aware and outspoken on the current 
uneasy situation and threat perception. Voting against the 2021 Franco-
German proposal to hold an EU summit with Russia, Lithuanian President 
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Gitanas Nausėda said the idea was like “trying to engage the bear to keep a 
pot of honey safe,” while Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš said 
Russia might see a summit as a reward when diplomacy had failed to end 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine (Reuters, 2021). Reflecting on the complex 
region with sensitive geopolitics, tangled dialogue between generations and 
approaching historical celebration, our Special Issue features 
interdisciplinary reflections, collaboration between generations of scholars 
and diverse geography.  
Contextual background: History, politics and geo-politics 
One third of a century after the break-up of the USSR has featured a 
roller-coaster ride for the citizens of the former republics. They faced a 
challenge of revisiting their identities, cultures and political outlooks. 
Evolution and transformation – or resistance to change – have affected 
several generations in the post-Soviet states. In our Special Issue, we focus 
on the intersections between identity, culture and geopolitics in five post-
Soviet states which ended with very different paths post-USSR. We put 
analytical focus on perceptions and narratives of post-Soviet Europe. We 
argue they build the foundation of the political communication flows inside 
the now independent societies and across their borders – when they interact 
with each other or when they relate to the world. 
The three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – proclaimed 
their firm pro-Western and pro-EU orientation following the historic fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989.  After the end of the Soviet Empire in 1991, the 
three states have entered the waiting list of the EU’s candidates and dedicated 
a decade to major political, economic and social reforms of their societies. 
In 2004, the three Baltic countries became member states of the EU, an 
exclusive and highly coveted club of developed European nations. 
Approaching the end of the second decade in the EU, the three societies 
explicate ebbs and flows in their visions of Europe, Russia, immediate geo-
political region and a wider world. However, their overall attitudes remain 
staunchly pro-Euro-Atlantic integration. Contributions to our Special Issue 
will reflect on the complex web of visions of Self and Others in Estonia 
(articles by Vlad Vernygora and Elizaveta Belonosova), Latvia (articles by 
Pauline Heinrichs, as well as Vineta Klienberga and Elizabete Vizgunova), 
and Lithuania (article by Gintaras Šumskas).  
In contrast, the then newly independent Ukraine was not chosen by the 
EU as a potential candidate country. This decision reverberates within 
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Ukraine until today (see Chaban and Elgström 2018, 2020; 2021a, b). In the 
early 1990s, Pew Survey poll of the post-Communist countries (199X) 
demonstrated that Ukrainian citizens were more pro-democracy than their 
counterparts in Poland or the Baltic states. At that time, Ukraine saw itself 
as a country with a sizeable and diverse economy, highly-educated work 
force, large strategically-located territory and big population. Immediately 
after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine had ended with the third largest 
nuclear arsenal in the world. Following the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine 
relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for promises by the signatories 
of the Memorandum – Russia, the US and the UK – to protect its sovereignty. 
Newly independent Ukraine has had a turbulent ride in the 30 years of its 
statehood. Endemic corruption, problematic rule of law and economic 
underperformance have riddled Ukraine. Yet, the Ukrainian political 
landscape has preserved the institute of democratic elections. Since 1991, 
Ukraine has been led by six democratically elected presidents. Irrespective 
of their political leanings and surroundings, all Ukrainian leaders have 
proclaimed Ukraine’s European ‘vector’, even if on a superficial level only. 
When the fourth Ukrainian president reneged on his previous promise to 
strike an Association Agreement with the EU choosing Russia instead, the 
events of the Maidan Revolution in 2013-14 demonstrated that decades of 
independence have solidified perceptions and narratives of Ukraine 
belonging to Europe and produced new generation ready to stand for this 
vision. Post-Maidan Ukraine has struck several main accords with the EU 
and NATO. In 2020, Ukraine has become as Associate Member of NATO. 
In 2017, Ukraine signed an Association Agreement/Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DCFTA) and the agreement on 
visa-free travel into the Schengen zone up to 90 days by Ukrainian citizens. 
However, to this day, the EU has not opened a pathway to membership 
candidacy for Ukraine. Contributions to our Special Issue deal with 
Ukraine’s problematics: article by Sabatovych dissects narratives and 
perceptions of the EU evolving over time and article by Natalia Chaban, 
Svitlana Zhabotynska and Anatoliy Chaban consider the external reception 
of the EU’s granting of the visa-free status to Ukrainian citizens (case-study 
Russia). 
Russia’s initial reaction to the transforming post-Soviet world saw 
Russia trying on some democratic practices and reforms under Yeltsin’s rule. 
Yet, following the change in leadership, Russian political outlook towards 
the West (including the EU) has reverted back to the guarded and even 
hostile attitudes. The change was partially triggered by the EU’s policies and 
initiatives towards its eastern neighbours. These were interpreted by Russia 
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as meddling into what traditionally has been the Russian sphere of influence, 
if not a threat by the West. In addition, the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century showed to the world the EU challenged by multiple crises of 
political, economic and social nature. Finally, the changing global landscape 
demonstrated an eroding multilateral rules-based global order, with a new 
set of existential non-traditional threats (climate catastrophe and global 
pandemics among them). A combination of internal and external factors have 
revived Russia’s “grand” geopolitical narrative as a key actor in Europe and 
globally. Contributions to our Special Issue engage with post-Soviet Russia’s 
self-narratives and self-images vis-à-vis Europe and the rest of the world, 
while factoring temporal dimension (article by Henrietta Mondry and 
Evgeny Pavlov), Russia’s narrative formulate and disseminated by 
influential think tanks (and specifically on “grey zones”) (article by Šarūnas 
Liekis and Viktorija Rusinaitė), and Russia’s media narratives on Ukraine 
and its pro-European dynamics revealed in framing Ukraine receiving a no-
visa regime from the EU (article by Natalia Chaban, Svitlana Zhabotynska 
and Anatoliy Chaban). 
This brief historical overview highlights that the five countries have 
intricate connections to each other in the course of their short-, mid- and 
long-term history, and their current and historical understanding of and 
attitudes to the West and the EU are a part of the story of their relations. 
Importantly, all contributions to the Special Issue also reflect on narratives 
and perceptions of Russia vis-à-vis Europe – as either a main or secondary 
theme. The three Baltic States and Ukraine remain ‘in between’ the two 
bigger players in the region – feeding into the concept of “liminal 
Europeanness” discussed at the start of this Introduction. We argue that a 
geopolitical competition between the two regional ‘hegemons’ will continue 
to affect Ukraine in the years to come, but also the three Baltic EU member 
states. The latter have a significant share of population who are Russian by 
ethnicity or Russian-speaking due to the legacies and migration patterns of 
the Soviet Union (33.8% of Russian speakers in Latvia, 29.8% in Estonia 
and 8% in Lithuania (Jakniunaite 2020)). 
Self-Other Imaginations: Continuum of Otherness 
One of the leading premises that informs our Special Issue is that 
narratives and perceptions, if dissected in cognitive, emotive and normative 
planes (see political psychologist Hopmann 1994), will not reveal clear-cut 
patterns. On the contrary, narratives and perceptions will demonstrate a 
complex intersection of self-identities and visions of the Other, the latter 
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located along the continuum of Otherness. Different positions on the 
continuum will elicit different attitudes. For the Baltic states, it is a dominant 
self-vision of historically belonging to the West and returning to the Western 
‘family’ after the collapse of the USSR. The Baltic societies conceive that 
their dominant norms and values resonate fully with the normative priorities 
of the Western societies. This vision, however, is complicated by the 
argument of “liminality” of the Baltic identities – the constant need to 
overcome their contested “Europeanness” as post-Soviet and post-socialist 
states caught between East and West (Mälksoo, 2009). Russia, on the other 
hand, is perceived to belong to a different normative camp (see e.g. 
Kleinberga and Vizgunova or Vernygora and Belonosova in this Issue). 
One of the main findings of the Special Issue is a particular vision of the 
Self in the region and the world emerging among younger citizens of the 
Baltic EU states.  For them, the historical break-through to Europe has 
been already achieved by the Baltic nations and it underlines a proud self-
narrative of the present and future and informs narratives on Ukraine (see 
e.g. articles by Šumskas and Heinrichs in this Issue).   
Literature in the field points to the post-Soviet Ukraine having a deeply 
polarised self-vision. On the one hand, it is about Ukraine’s centuries-long 
strife to be a part of the Western paradigm and value system. This narrative 
justifies the need to reform the Ukrainian society post-USSR. On the other 
hand, there is a narrative of the historical connections with Russia and certain 
normative resonances with the neighbour to the East. This narrative contests 
Western values and Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West. The most 
recent events in the relations between Ukraine and Russia – the annexation 
of Crimea, the ongoing violent conflict in the east of Ukraine and propaganda 
affronts undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine – have been 
solidifying the images of Russia as Ukraine’s hostile Other (see also 
Sabatovych in this Issue). In contrast, the Western actors (including the EU 
and the Baltic states in it) are increasingly seen as allies and friends.  
Russia’s self-vision registers becoming a key pole of the global politics 
of the 21st century. This includes Russia’s self-definition as an heir 
presumptive to the USSR legacy – a vision that provides justification to 
control former Soviet republics.  Following this self-image, Russia sees itself 
as a viable power with a proud history of domination and influence and 
current geopolitical ambitions. Official Kremlin narratives asserting this 
right to hegemony in the post-Soviet space explicitly draw on neo-
Eurasianist proleptic constructs and neo-medievalist models propagated by 
Russia’s ultra-right intellectuals (see Mondry and Pavlov in this Issue). 
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Russia also defines itself as an international actor with a unique (Eurasian) 
set of norms and values informed by its rich culture and history. Importantly, 
Russia conceives these values as different – better and often opposing – to 
the norms and values of the West (including Europe) (see Liekis and 
Rusinaitė in this Issue). In this context, Russia solidifies the image of 
Ukraine which is perceived to be moving in its norms and values closer to 
the West/Europe – as the Other (see Chaban et al. in this Issue), arguably 
corroborating the official Russian narrative of Ukraine becoming an “anti-
Russia” (see above). 
The Russo-Ukrainian conflict reminds us again that intersections of 
identity and geopolitics are never simple. The Russian treatment of the 
former Soviet republics as it “natural” area of geopolitical control clashed 
with the EU’s vision of its enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Initially, 
Russia, hit by the collapse of the USSR on socio-economic and political 
planes, did not react aggressively to the introduction of the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Policy in 1995. Yet, the creation of the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership with six post-Soviet states of Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine in 2009 was perceived in Russia as a 
threat. This perception was further supported by the official applications by 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to become members of NATO (declined by 
the Alliance). Russia saw the West encroaching into Russia’s traditional 
sphere of geopolitical influence and has retaliated with aggression against 
Georgia and later Ukraine, the two most pro-Western post-Soviet states. The 
Baltic states, aware of Russia’s hard power and methods of influence through 
their own experiences in the past, share growing concerns about their own 
security. These states have become the most vociferous supporters of 
Ukraine (and earlier Georgia), advocating for a pan-EU support of Ukraine 
in the ongoing violent conflict, insisting on sanctions against Russia and 
backing up Ukraine’s case as a future EU candidate country. 
A complicated map of relations between the six actors brings in the first 
key theme in our Special Issue – Self-Other relations in an uneasy process of 
identity transformations typical for this region. This theme invites systematic 
considerations of the process of Othering and its result – the imaginary 
continuum of Otherness from friends and allies to distinct Others who may 
become enemies and even nemeses (see e.g. the model of “difference” – 
“otherness” – “enmity” examined by Chaban et al. in this Issue). All 
contributions to our Special Issue engage with the continuum of Otherness 
and contemplate its role in shaping and re-shaping identities in this 
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geopolitical region. The contributions also factor complex interactions 
between time, space and change. 
Temporal Considerations 
The second theme that unites contributions to this Special Issue deals 
with fluidity and uncertainty, changing world and transition. In our brief 
overview above, we highlighted profound historical changes in the last 30 
years in this region. However, the societies in the focus of this SI have been 
affected by transformation and change event before the collapse of the USSR 
in the summer of 1991. Perestroika, a complex reform programme of the last 
Soviet government, inflicted major shocks on the existing narratives and 
self-visions. And while debates on the effectiveness of perestroika on the 
worldviews of Soviet citizens and elites are ongoing, we argue that it has left 
a distinct imprint on the perceptions of the ever-changing world, relativity of 
the historical truth and fluidity in this particular region. Relevant and vast 
literature on the post-Soviet space traces changes at the levels of identity; in 
views of how the world is organized and evolves; and how every-day 
matters, policies and issues are conceived and executed. Contributions to the 
Special Issue focus on both the process of change and major ruptures 
(“critical junctions”). Recognizing temporality as a key feature of any 
narrative unfolding from the past through present to the future, some of the 
scholars in this Issue prioritize a trajectory of the change “from past to 
present” (e.g. Sabatovych, Kleinberga and Vizgunova). Others provide an 
insight into the move “from the present to the future” (Heinrichs), or, 
proleptically, constructing political narratives in a way that disturbs normal 
temporal progression (Mondry and Pavlov). Change and continuity are 
always dependent on perspective. Contributions to the Special Issue map 
those perspectives when examining their cases studies. 
Narratives, images and perceptions: conceptual models 
The third theme of this issue is a conceptual engagement with the 
notions of images, perceptions and narratives in political communication 
around international relations to understand the unfolding of change in 
reality and construction of change in the minds of publics in the region. The 
already axiomatic statement “whose story is better, wins” (Nye 2019) gets 
additional traction at times of uncertainty and fluidity. In the contested post-
Soviet space, recognition and reputation matter, and ideology and 
propaganda techniques influence everyday frames of political 
communication inside the states and exchanges across borders. As such, 
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contributions to this issue have engaged with several models considering a 
concept of “narrative” linking different disciplines together – international 
relations (IR), cognitive science, cultural studies, political science, 
communication studies.  
Several contributions engage with the IR’s strategic narrative theory 
(Miskimmon et al. 2013). This model proposes a three-level paradigm in the 
life-cycle of a strategic narrative: system, policy and identity levels. In this 
theory, system narratives define actors’ views on international order; identity 
narratives describe how actors view themselves and the others within the 
system; and issue narratives reveal actors’ attitude towards specific policy 
issues (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p.7). The theory also talks about three 
distinct yet intertwined phases in the information flow: formulation, 
projection and receptions. Contributions to the Special Issue explore cases 
on all levels. Papers by Klenberga and Vizgunova, Mondry and Pavlov, 
Chaban et al., Vernygora and Belonosova, Liekis and Rusinaitė deal with 
formulation and projection of the narratives. Reception of narratives is in 
main focus of the articles by Heinrichs, Sabatovych and Šumskas. 
Contributions to this Special Issue also bring analytical attention to different 
narrators (e.g. official discourses, think tank influencers, media, or youth). 
Contributions to the Special Issues that engage with the strategic 
narrative theory introduce several conceptual innovations to it. For example, 
Kleinberga and Vizgunova add to the conceptualization of the alignment 
between the narrative levels. In their focus are two different types of 
alignment – between levels of narratives produced by the same narrator and 
between narratives projected by different narrators in one society (in this 
case, official political and media actors). Both cohorts are in the business of 
opinion-making, and narrative alignment in terms of consonance between 
them is telling and revealing of opportunities to persuade, especially in the 
democratic societies.  The divergences are also important. 
Adding to the strategic narrative theory conceptualization, our 
contributors develop the notion of temporality (long, short and medium) 
(Heinrichs); argue the central role of the identity-level narrative in the SNT 
model (Heinrichs); examine scope conditions for the stickiness of the 
narratives (Šumskas); explore the role of visuality and intertextuality in the 
projection of narratives (Chaban et al.); study the nature of public 
information important in understanding the reception stage within the 
strategic narrative cycle (Sumskas) as well as propose the notion of a hybrid 
toolbox where  there is a need to promote strategic narrative in potentially 
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hostile environments (Liekis and Rusinaitė) and explore public diplomacy 
analytical instrumentarium used to communicate strategic narrative in such 
environments (Vernygora and Belonosova).  
The Special Issue also features case studies that engaged with other 
theoretical models to explain perceptions, and more specifically their 
evolution. Sabatovych engages with a theoretical approach from the school 
of historical institutionalism, namely path dependency theoretical approach. 
While the school focuses on radical institutional change, Sabatovych 
demonstrate how this model may be used to advance perceptions studies by 
explaining the mechanism of change in public attitudes. This approach is 
useful when dramatic changes in outlook are taking place. In the case by 
Sabatovych, it is ideology that is accepted as a marker of an institutional 
change. Mondry and Pavlov explore the application of proleptic futurity in 
narratives of newspaper articles. They focus on the specific genre of 
editorials as it emerged in the late Soviet Union and demonstrate features of 
continuity between Soviet editorials and the current writing of important 
public and political personalities, such as Aleksandr Prokhanov, Aleksandr 
Dugin, and Vladislav Surkov. Mondry and Pavlov argue that employment of 
temporo-spatial aspects of the popular Neo-Eurasianist ideology as well as 
use of folk narratives based on the ability to dream allows the promotion of 
the notion of culture-specific temporality linked to the stability of country’s 
geopolitical borders. They conclude that today’s official Kremlin narratives 
increasingly rely on the proleptic temporality typical of the particularistic 
ideology of the Russian far right.  
Methods 
This Special Issue showcases a range of methods to study narratives 
and perceptions. These methods applied to analyse multiple sources of data 
such as media texts (editorials and daily news articles), media visuals 
(photographs and cartoons), opinion of elites and educated youth, official 
documents. 
Heinrichs applies the method of narrative analysis to analyse youth 
opinion collected in the course of the Q-Sort focus groups in Latvia. Šumskas 
applies a mixed qualitative and quantitative content analysis techniques to 
identify indicators of media texts in Lithuanian e-press that correlate with 
higher audience demand for news that report Russia. Kleinberga and 
Vizgunova employ narrative analysis to analyse narratives on Ukraine, the 
EU and Russian that emerge in media and official discourses in Latvia. 
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Sabatovych undertakes an interpretative analysis of elite interviews 
comparing opinions across time. Chaban, Zhabotynska and Chaban apply the 
cognitive science protocol of the Narrative-Based Political Concept to 
analyse visual images accompanying Russian e-media news texts on 
Ukraine’s no-visa agreement with the EU. Vernygora and Belonosova 
employ discourse analysis and process tracing when examining eight annual 
reviews of the Estonian Internal Security Service (2012-2019/20). Liekis and 
Rusinaitė focus on content analysis of the productions by the Russian think 
tanks that lean towards advocacy model and publish in English language, 
seeking to internationalise their advocacy model. Mondry and Pavlov use a 
thematic interpretative approach in their analysis of narratives which 
strategically blur the boundaries between objectivized style of newspaper 
articles and subjective style of editorials.  
Structure of the Special Issue 
The Special Issues starts with four article that dissect perceptions and 
narratives in the Baltic states: Vineta Klienberga and Elizabete Vizgunova 
on Latvia; Pauline Heinrichs on Latvia, Vlad Vernygora and Elizaveta 
Belonosova on Estonia, and Gintaras Šumskas on Lithuania. Article by Iana 
Sabatovych focuses on Ukraine, while article by Natalia Chaban, Svitlana 
Zhabotynska and Anatoliy Chaban deals with Russia’s framing of Ukraine. 
Special Issue concludes with articles by Šarūnas Liekis and Viktorija 
Rusinaitė, and Henrietta Mondry and Evgeny Pavlov – both teams of authors 
elaborate opinion making discourses in Russia. 
Concluding remarks 
Some case studies demonstrate that post-Soviet cultural narratives are 
often concerned with aspects of transgenerational stability and the passing of 
cultural and ethnocultural knowledge to future generations. This concern is 
manifested in the notion of ontological future in the case of Latvia with its 
diminishing population and inter-EU migration of young people. Issues of 
demographics drive this preoccupation with the ontological future where, 
paradoxically, being part of EU brought challenges of assimilation and 
acculturation which threaten the national identity to no less a degree than in 
Soviet times. In Russia with its multiethnic population the complexities of 
transgenerational continuity are resolved in the narratives of cohesion 
achieved by the notions of scientific know-how and the alleged ability to 
dream about the future, all of which is underpinned by the construct of a 
shared past. Yet, internal and external strategic narratives differ. 
16      N. CHABAN, H. MONDRY, E. PAVLOV 
Contributions to the Special Issue unpack complex visions, perceptions and 
narratives along the Self-Other continuum that emerge in each country 
discussed here and contemplate their impact on mapping the understanding 
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